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Note: Wilderness Management and the
Multiple-Use Mandate
One of the most vexing problems which historically has con-
fronted lawmakers, both legislative and judicial, is the necessity
of transforming philosophical concepts into legal precepts. Such
a definitional problem was encountered in the attempt to trans-
late the abstract idea of "wilderness" into statutory law. Wil-
derness is a state of mind, an experience brought on by a par-
ticular set of surroundings. As such, the concept varies from
person to person and a general definition cannot easily be ex-
pressed in words. As Roderick Nash has said, "[o]ne man's wil-
derness may be another's roadside picnic ground."1  Neverthe-
less, the desire to set aside certain areas of land which would
be maintained in a natural state led Congress to attempt the task
of definition and to embody a particular view of wilderness in
the Wilderness Act of 1964.2 This view, though perhaps as good
as any definition yet advanced, has inevitably resulted in prob-
lems when stretched over the many functions which such a defi-
nition must serve.
This Note is concerned with one such problem, that of the
management of wilderness areas protected by the statute. Wil-
derness management is in itself a contradiction in terms, for the
very idea of a wilderness as a place preserved from interference
by man would seem to preclude the type of ordered control im-
plicit in the concept of management. A managed wilderness
would not be a wilderness at all, but rather a primitive park.
Physical realities, however, dictate that certain functions falling
within the scope of "management" be performed even in wilder-
ness areas. The problem has been succinctly expressed by one
commentator:
The quality of wilderness is an ephemeral thing best nurtured in
neglect. But this is impossible if the area is to be used with ade-
quate provision for human safety and enjoyment. Some man-
agement is essential but with so light a touch that it makes
hardly a mark on the unblemished canvas of the wild.3
1. R. NAsH, WILDERNESS AND THE AmiacAN Mm 1 (rev. ed. 1973).
2. 78 Stat. 890 (codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1131-36 (1970)) [herein-
after referred to as the Act or the Wilderness Act].
3. I. CowAx, WILDERNEss-CoNcEPT, FUNCTIoN, mm MANAGEMENT
28-29 (1968).
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The determination of how and to what extent such management
activities are to be carried on presents a problem of harmonizing
the concept of wilderness embodied in the Act with the realities
encountered in its actual use. Achieving a proper balance in the
relationship between concept and reality may be crucial to the
continued existence of wilderness.
I. THE DEFINITION OF WILDERNESS
The concept of wilderness can be and has been defined in
many ways.4 One group of definitions centers around the intan-
gible aspects of the "wilderness experience." For example, Rod-
erick Nash has said of wilderness: "The term designates a qual-
ity.., that produces a certain mood or feeling in a given individ-
ual and, as a consequence, may be assigned by that person to
a specific place."5 Nash's idea of wilderness as a state of mind
is also characteristic of many other definitions. It appears again
in the testimony of the late Howard Zahniser, a leading conserva-
tionist, before one of the early Senate hearings on the wilderness
bill:
Wilderness is a character that land has. It is not a special use.
"Wilderness" is a term that has significance because of the
things it negates. "Chastity" is another such term. The various
kinds of lands that have their various uses can all be wilderness.
Wilderness is the first basic resource that we started out with in
this country .... 6
This type of definition, therefore, reflects a view of "wilderness"
as an experience, almost an emotion. Although in theory this
state of mind could be produced in a particular individual by
almost any semi-wild surrounding, proponents of such a "purist"
definition of wilderness have concentrated their preservation
efforts on land which remains in a natural state, unaffected by
civilization, and which affords a visitor an opportunity to be
alone. These two elements, virginity and solitude, appear to be
the most conducive to the "wilderness experience" and there-
fore provide the standard by which the purist is able to classify
land as wilderness. Accordingly, under the purist philosophy
4. One writer has offered the malapropian definition that wilder-
ness is a place "where the hand of man has never set foot." Brower, For-
ward to VoIcEs FOR =r WILDErNEss xi (W. Schwartz ed. 1969). For a
sampling of other, more serious attempts at definition, see NAsH, supra
note 1, at 1-7.
5. NAsE, supra note 1, at 1.
6. Hearings on S. 1176 Before the Subcomm. on Public Lands of
the Senate Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 85th Cong., 1st Sess,
158 (1957).
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these are the elements which any management system should
seek to preserve.
This does not mean, however, that the adherents of a purist
definition feel that the benefits derived from wilderness are
available only to those who actually experience primitive sur-
roundings. The benefits are thought to extend to society as a
whole, even to those members of society who will never visit
the area. Society benefits by perpetuation of the spiritual, edu-
cational, historical, scientific, and abstract values 7 to be derived
from wilderness. Another, more direct benefit is thought to ac-
crue to each individual. Wallace Stegner, head of the Creative
Writing Center at Stanford University, described this intangible
value of wilderness for the Outdoor Recreation Resources Review
Commission:
Something will have gone out of us as a people if we ever
let the remaining wilderness be destroyed;... if we pollute the
last clear air and dirty the last clean streams and push our
paved roads through the last of the silence, so that never again
will Americans be free in their own country from the noise, the
exhausts, the stinks of human and automotive waste. And so
that never again can we have the chance to see ourselves sin-
gle, separate, vertical and individual in the world, part of the
environment of trees and rocks and soil.... Without any re-
maining wilderness we are committed wholly, without chance
for even momentary reflection and rest, to a headlong drive
into our technological termite-life, the Brave New World of
a completely man-controlled environment. We need wilder-
ness preserved-as much of it as is still left, and as many kinds
-because it was the challenge against which our character as a
people was formed. The reminder and the reassurance that it is
still there is good for our spiritual health even if we never once
in ten years set foot in it. It is good for us when we are young,
because of the incomparable sanity it can bring briefly, as vaca-
tion and rest, into our insane lives. It is important to us when
we are old simply because it is there-important, that is, simply
as [an] idea.8
7. The relationship of each of these values to wilderness and their
benefit to society has been well explained by conservationists. For a de-
tailed explanation, see generally Gilbert, Notes From a Wilderness Lay-
man, in WILDERNESS An TH QUALIY OF LIFE 81 (1969) (spiritual value);
Hearings on S. 1176, supra note 6, at 185-86 (educational value); id. at
183-84 (historical value); THE MEANING OF WI rNESs To SCIENCE (D.
Brower ed. 1960) (scientific value); OuTDooR RECREATION RESOURCES RE-
viEw COMMIssION, STUDY REPORT No. 3, WILDERNESS AN REcREATION-A
REPORT ON RESOURCES, VALUES, AND PROBLEms 34 (1962) [hereinafter
cited as ORRRC STUDY REPORT 3], quoted in text accompanying note 8,
infra (abstract value). It is noteworthy that the Wilderness Act itself
provides that wilderness areas shall be devoted to "the public purposes
of recreational, scenic, scientific, educational, conservation, and historical
use." 16 U.S.C. § 1133(b) (1970). See also 36 C.F.R. § 293.2 (1973).
8. ORRRC STUDY REPORT 3, supra note 7, at 34.
19741
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A purist definition of wilderness is not completely satisfac-
tory for all purposes, however. Nash, after offering the defini-
tion quoted earlier, sums up the problems which it presents:
Given. .. the tendency of wilderness to be a state of mind, it is
tempting to let the term define itself: to accept as wilderness
those places people call wildnerness .... The limitation of this
procedure, however, is the way it makes definition an individual
matter and hence no definition at all.9
The purist concept of the wilderness experience can never be ex-
pressed in units of measurement. A more practical definition
embodying quantifiable values is required for purposes of select-
ing certain areas to be protected, drawing boundaries, and decid-
ing which activities will be permitted and which will be banned.
Thus, when the Outdoor Recreation Resources Review Commis-
sion (ORRRC) began its study and classification of land suitable
for protection as wilderness, it formulated its definition in terms
of the physical characteristics which such an area should possess:
A wilderness tract is defined as an area of public or Indian
land available for overnight recreation use within the contiguous
United States (1) at least 100,000 acres in extent, (2) containing
no roads usable by the public, (3) within a reasonably unified
boundary configuration, and (4) showing no significant eco-
logical disturbance from on-site human activity-except that do-
mestic livestock grazing is an accepted disturbance in the West
and early-day logging is accepted for eastern tracts.',
This definition, showing the strong influence of recreation as the
Commission's central object, was to have a significant effect upon
the idea of wilderness that was finally written into statutory law.
Such a practical, quantifiable definition is in sharp contrast
to the inspiring but vague ideas of Nash, Zahniser, and Stegner.
They represent two possible approaches to the definition of wil-
derness: the purist definition is a more accurate representation
of what we seek to preserve, while the practical standard of the
ORRRC is a result of the necessity of making choices. Although
both might reach the same result, the possibility for disagree-
ment is substantial.
The definition of wilderness which came to be embodied in
the Wilderness Act is an attempt to combine these two
approaches.11 The first sentence of section 2 (c) of that Act states
the ideal:
A wilderness, in contrast with those areas where man and
9. NASH, supra note 1, at 5-6.
10. ORRRC STuDy REsORx 3, supra note 7, at 3 (footnotes omitted).
11. See Hearings on S. 174 Before the Subcomm. on Public Lands
of the Senate Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 87th Cong., 1st Sess.
2 (1961) (statement of Chairman Anderson).
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his own works dominate the landscape, is hereby recognized as
an area where the earth and its community of life are untram-
meled by man, where man himself is a visitor who does not re-
main.12
It thus expresses the ideas of virginity and solitude which have
been identified as major elements of the "wilderness experience."
But the second sentence of that same subsection offers a more
practical definition of what an area must be in order to qualify
for protection under the Act:
An area of wilderness is further defined to mean in this chapter
an area of undeveloped Federal land retaining its primeval char-
acter and influence, without permanent improvements or human
habitation, which is protected and managed so as to preserve
its natural conditions and which (1) generally appears to have
been affected primarily by the forces of nature, with the imprint
of man's work substantially unnoticeable; (2) has outstanding
opportunities for solitude or a primitive and unconfined type of
recreation; (3) has at least five thousand acres of land or is of
sufficient size as to make practicable its preservation and use in
an unimpaired condition; and (4) may also contain ecological,
geological, or other features of scientific, educational, scenic, or
historical value.'3
In this respect the statutory definition is very similar to that
of the ORRRC, although modified somewhat to make it clear that
an area is not to be denied protection merely because it has some
significant feature besides its wilderness character, and also to
make the size requirement more flexible. The practical defini-
tion, by itself, does not consider the purist criteria of virginity
and solitude to be controlling. The use of words like "generally,"
"primarily," and "substantially" indicates that this half of the
definition also takes other values into account, notably recrea-
tional value. Thus, applying only this half of the definition, an
area of land which does not produce a true "wilderness experi-
ence" could nevertheless be protected by the Act if it provides
valuable primitive recreational opportunities.
The practical definition cannot be considered alone, however.
It represents only half of the statutory definition, and the two
halves must be considered together to effect the intent of Con-
gress. That the two strains are not easily synthesized is evident
from the fact that Congress itself was not able to do so and even-
tually compromised on the dual definition after seven years of
refining the statute. In so doing, Congress essentially left to the
administering agencies the job of applying its definition to con-
crete situations. But it has not been able so easily to rid itself
of a difficult problem. The tension between the two halves of
12. 16 U.S.C. § 1131(c) (1970).
13. Id.
1974]
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the dual definition has already created a major dispute in the
classification of federal land as wilderness, and in this form the
difficulties inherent in the dual definition have come back to
plague Congress.
The problem in classification became an issue because, under
the terms of the Act, a large proportion of the wilderness imme-
diately protected was located in the Western states14 and as such
was not available to the masses of Eastern city dwellers who
were unable to travel across the country in search of a wilderness
experience. Although the Act did mandate a review of all primi-
tive areas managed by the Forest Service15 and all roadless areas
14. The "instant wildernesses" created by the Act were those areas
previously designated as "wild," "wilderness," or "canoe" by the Forest
Service. 16 U.S.C. § 1132(a) (1970). These areas were almost exclu-
sively in the Western states. Only three of the 54 instant wilderness
areas were located east of the 100th meridian: the Great Gulf Wilderness
in New Hampshire, and the Linville Gorge and Shining Rock Wilder-
nesses in North Carolina. These three areas encompassed 26,455 acres
out of a total of 9.1 million acres immediately protected. A fourth area
of semi-wilderness, see note 113 infra, was also made an "instant wilder-
ness"-the Boundary Waters Canoe Area in linnesota, covering 886,673
acres (later reduced to 747,840 acres by boundary adjustments and more
accurate surveys). FIRST ANNUAL REPORT ON TE STATUS Or THE NA-
TIoNAL WmEss PRESERVATioN SYSTEm, H.R. Doc. No. 79, 89th Cong.,
1st Sess. 7-12 (1965).
The Act also provided for immediate inclusion of 34 national forest
primitive areas totaling 5.5 million acres. These areas, which had for-
merly been classified as "primitive" by the Forest Service, were pro-
tected as part of the National Wilderness Preservation System pending
review by the Forest Service of their suitability for permanent protec-
tion. See note 15 infra. None of these areas is located east of the 100th
meridian. FIRST ANNuAL REPORT, supra, at 13-16.
15. 16 U.S.C. § 1132(b) (1970). As of November, 1973, the review
had been completed on 23 of the original 34 national forest primitive
areas. Twelve areas, totaling nearly 1.5 million acres, had been added
to the Wilderness System, and at least another 290,000 acres had been
added by major adjustments of existing areas. Eleven other areas, en-
compassing approximately 1.7 million acres, had been proposed to Con-
gress for inclusion but not acted upon. The remaining 11 areas were still
being reviewed. NnTH ANNuAL REPORT ON =rn STATuS or T NATIONAL
WILEmR _ES PRESERVATiON SySTEm, H.R. Doc. No. 194, 93d Cong., 1st Sess.
2-4 (1973).
In addition to the above review, which was mandated by the Act, the
Forest Service has also voluntarily engaged in an inventory and review
of roadless and undeveloped areas of 5,000 acres or more under its con-
trol to identify for further study any possible additions to the Wilderness
System. Of 1,499 such areas (totaling 56 million acres) studied, the For-
est Service had by November, 1973, selected 274 as potential New Wil-
derness Study Areas. These 274 areas total approximately 12.3 million
acres, and of them only two areas, encompassing about 37,000 acres, are
located in the East. One other area of 8,500 acres is in Puerto Rico. FOR-
EST SERVIcE, U.S. DEP'T Or AGmcULTuRE, FNAL ENvmoN mENTAL STATE-
mENTON ROADLESS AREAS 65-76 (1973).
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of over 5,000 acres within the national parks 6 with the intention
that any areas found suitable should be recommended for addi-
tion to the National Wilderness Preservation System,1'7 the re-
view program has thus far not provided wilderness lands for the
eastern United States.' 8 This lack of wilderness in the East has
16. 16 U.S.C. § 1132(c) (1970). The Department of the Interior ac-
tually has two responsibilities in this regard. First, it must review every
roadless area of 5,000 acres or more within the National Park System and
recommend to Congress those which it deems suitable for protection as
wilderness. Of the 63 areas reviewed as of November, 1973, four which
encompass 190,945 acres in total have been added to the Wilderness Sys-
tem. None of these four areas is located in the East. Of the 24 areas
recommended to Congress but on which action was still pending as of
that date, five which total over 287,000 acres are located east of the 100th
meridian: the Badlands National Monument, South Dakota (58,924
acres); Cumberland Gap National Historical Park, Virginia, Kentucky,
and Tennessee (6,375 acres); Isle Royale National Park, Michigan (120,-
588 acres); Shenandoah National Park, Virginia (73,280 acres); Theodore
Roosevelt National Memorial Park, North Dakota (28,335 acres). NINTH
ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 15; S. 602, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).
Second, the Department of the Interior is charged with reviewing
every roadless island and roadless area of 5,000 acres or more within
the National Wildlife Refuge System. As of November, 1973, 113 units
of 29 million acres had been identified as requiring review under this
provision of the Act. Of those, 25 areas totaling 103,611 acres had been
added to the Wilderness System as of that date. Twelve of these are
in the East. NINTH ANNmAL REPORT, supra note 15; SEvENTH ANNUAL
REPORT ON THE STATUS OF THE NATIONAL WILDERNEss PREsERvATION Sys-
Trs, H.R. Doc. No. 156, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 22-23 (1971).
17. Hereinafter referred to as the Wilderness System or the System.
This is the name given to the collection of federal lands which the Wil-
derness Act declared would be protected as wilderness. 16 U.S.C. § 1131
(a) (1970). Upon passage of the Act, the Wilderness System was made
up of 54 areas of "instant wilderness" amounting to 9 million acres, see
note 14 supra, plus 34 primitive areas totaling 5.5 million acres which
were protected as wilderness pending completion of a review by the For-
est Service to determine if they should be proposed to Congress (by the
President) for permanent inclusion in the System. See note 15 supra.
As of November, 1973, 41 new areas encompassing nearly 1.8 million
acres have been added to the System, as follows: 12 national forest
areas totaling approximately 1.5 million acres, see note 15 supra; four
national park areas totaling over 190,000 acres, see note 16 supra; and
25 national wildlife refuges totaling over 103,000 acres, see note 16 su-
For a history of the wilderness preservation movement which culmi-
nated in the establishment of the System, see generally D. BALwn, THE
QuimT REVOLUTION: GRASS RooTs OF TODAY'S WLDERNss PRESERVATION
MovEMENT (1972).
18. Since passage of the Act, only 12 Eastern areas have been added
to the Wilderness System out of a total of 41 additions. All 12 are na-
tional wildlife refuges. See note 16 supra. These refuges are typically
small-the 12 areas total only 34,891 acres and the largest is 25,150 acres
-and relatively inaccessible, doing little to satisfy the demand for wil-
derness recreation which has resulted in the Eastern wilderness move-
1974]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
precipitated the first real confrontation between adherents of dif-
fering definitions of wilderness. On one side, the Forest Service
has taken the purist approach19 and, ignoring the more practical,
recreation-oriented purpose which its critics justly feel can also
be found in the Act, it has concluded that since nearly all of
the Eastern national forests were at one time significantly af-
fected by man's works-primarily logging-they cannot qualify
as wilderness. 20 Opposition to this position has come from a di-
verse coalition of preservationists and Eastern interests who for
various reasons want land in the East set aside as wilderness. 21
The fact that the Forest Service's position derives from the ideas
of preservationists such as Nash and Zahniser demonstrates the
difficulties in a dual definition: although both sides embrace the
purist ideal embodied in the first part of the Act's definition,
they translate it into different practical terms.
The proponents of Eastern wilderness, thus frustrated in
their aftempts to persuade the Forest Service to propose certain
lands in the East for inclusion in the Wilderness System, have
begun to bring their proposals directly to Congress in circumven-
tion of the statutory procedure.22  Once again, therefore, Con-
gress is faced with the problem of deciding how the purist ideal
it endorsed in the first portion of the statutory definition is to
be translated into reality: whether wilderness is to be a pure
and solitary area of untrammeled natural beauty or a not-so-
pure and not-so-solitary area where people may engage in prim-
ment. See generally Pub. L. 92-364, 86 Stat. 505 (1972); Pub. L. 91-504,
84 Stat. 1104 (1970); Pub. L. 90-532, 82 Stat. 883 (1968). The review
process also promises little wilderness for the East in the near future.
Of the areas now before Congress, there are no Eastern national forest
areas and only five Eastern national park areas, totaling approximately
287,000 acres. See note 16 supra.
19. See Hearings on S. 316 Before the Subcomm. on Public Lands of
the Senate Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 93d Cong., 1st Sess.,
pt. 1, at 19, 46-49 (1973) (Forest Service accused of taking a "purist"
attitude in assessing the potential of Eastern lands as wilderness).
20. Id. at 22-23. Doubt was cast on this position, however, by a
court decision which held that an area of land was not disqualified from
consideration as wilderness by the presence of an overgrown service
road. Parker v. United States, 309 F. Supp. 593 (D. Colo. 1970), affd,
448 F.2d 793 (10th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 989 (1972).
21. See generally Hearings on S. 316, supra note 19.
22. The statute clearly contemplates that the Secretaries of the In-
terior and Agriculture, through the President, will recommend additions
to the Wilderness System to Congress. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 1132(b)-(c)
(1970). A bill which was introduced in the 93d Congress, however,
would bypass the Secretaries and would directly add new lands to the
System. S. 3433, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1974).
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itive recreation. Legislation now pending before Congress appar-
ently leans toward the former. 23
Under pressure,24 the Forest Service has recently modified
23. S. 3433, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1974), was passed by the Senate
on May 31, 1974. See 120 CONG. REc. S 9383-S 9399 (daily ed. May 31,
1974). This bill would include 19 Eastern areas in the Wilderness Sys-
tem immediately upon its passage, and would designate 40 other Eastern
areas as study areas on which the Secretary of Agriculture must advise
the President of his recommendations within five years.
Management of the new Eastern wilderness areas would be generally
in accordance with the provisions of the Wilderness Act. The multiple-
use mandate of the original Act is therefore presumably preserved. How-
ever, consistent with the view that these areas require special protection
in order for natural restoration to return them to their untrammeled
state, the bill provides special safeguards not extended to Western wil-
derness lands. For example, the lands designated by the bill (either as
wilderness or as study areas) are withdrawn from all forms of appropri-
ation under the mining laws immediately upon passage; grazing is al-
lowed only by permit on wilderness areas; and new water development
projects on Eastern wilderness lands are prohibited.
The study areas are required to be managed "so as to maintain their
potential for inclusion in the national wilderness preservation system un-
til Congress has determined otherwise . . ." An outside limit on this
protection is set at the expiration of the third Congress from the date
of the submission of the President's recommendation for the area, how-
ever. It was felt that Congress should be able to act within this period,
which might total eight years. Id. at S 9322.
Therefore Congress, although including areas in the Wilderness Sys-
tem which are not up to the standards which the Forest Service has set,
would make special provisions designed to allow these lands to return
to their natural state, thus preserving the purity of the Wilderness Sys-
tem. This is in marked contrast to an earlier version of the Eastern wil-
derness bill, which would have enacted findings that
an area is qualified and suitable for designation as wilderness
which (1), though man's works may have been present in the
past, has been or may be so restored by natural influences as to
generally appear to have been affected primarily by the forces
of nature, with the imprint of man's work substantially unno-
ticeable, ... (3) which may, upon designation as wilderness,
contain certain preexisting nonconforming uses, improvements,
structures, or installations; and the Congress has reaffirmed
these established policies in the subsequent designation of addi-
tional areas, exercising its sole authority to determine the suit-
ability of such areas for designation as wilderness ....
S. 316, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 1(e) (1973) (emphasis added). S. 316, if
enacted, would have modified the definition of wilderness so as to change
the emphasis of the Act from wilderness preservation to primitive recrea-
tion. S. 3433, while allowing temporary inclusion of less qualified areas,
maintains the purist ideal of the Act as well; as such, it is consistent
with the dual definition in the Wilderness Act. Because the multiple-
use mandate (discussed later in this Note, see text accompanying notes
30-63) and the emphasis on primitive recreation are allowed to remain,
however, this substantial amendment of the Wilderness Act would not
solve the major problems to which this Note is directed.
24. See, e.g., the 1972 Environmental Message to the Congress of
President Nixon:
Unfortunately, few of these wilderness areas are within easy
1974]
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its position on this question and has called for an amendment
to the Wilderness Act which would allow areas affected by man's
works to be included in the Wilderness System in the East only.25
Different criteria of suitability would be employed for these
areas.2 6 However, the Service still adheres to its "purist" inter-
pretation of the original Act-as evidenced by its feeling that
an amendment is required to permit a different interpretation-
and will continue to judge the suitability of Western lands ac-
cordingly.27
The problem of Eastern wilderness is a good example of the
basic conflict between the halves of the statutory definition of
wilderness. That problem will probably be solved by statute in
the near future, but the solutions which have been proposed to
solve it are narrow ones which do not seek to resolve the underly-
ing conflict between two different concepts of wilderness. A par-
tial solution for one small problem will only serve to exacerbate
difficulties in other areas.
One such area, where the conflict within the dual definition
has resulted in special difficulties, is that of wilderness manage-
ment. The problem of administering protected lands consistent
with the nature of wilderness presents itself not only in major
policy decisions on the nature and extent of uses to be made of
wilderness land but also in day-to-day management decisions.
The administering agencies have apparently tried to solve both
aspects of the problem by an accommodation of the opposing
access of the most populous areas of the United States.... A
few of the areas proposed today or previously are in the eastern
sections of the country, but the great majority of wilderness
areas are found in the West. This of course is where most of our
pristine wild areas are. But a greater effort can still be made
to see that wilderness recreation values are preserved to the
maximum extent possible, in the regions where most of our peo-
ple live.
-I am therefore directing the Secretaries of Agriculture and the
Interior to accelerate the identification of areas in the Eastern
United States having wilderness potential.
CoucI ON EN IRoNmENTAL QuALT, THE PRmiDENT'S 1972 ENvmRoN-
MVIENTAL PROGROA 10 (1972) (emphasis in original).
25. Hearings on S. 316, supra note 19, at 21-24 (statement of John
R. McGuire, Chief of the Forest Service). See also S. 938, 93d Cong.,
1st Sess. (1973).
26. Hearings on S. 316, supra note 19, at 24-25. Despite passage by
the Senate of S. 3433, which would include Eastern areas in the Wilder-
ness System without permanently changing the criteria for suitability,
the Nixon Administration's position continued to be that of the Forest
Service. See Message from the President of the United States on Preser-
vation of Wilderness Areas, 120 CoNG. REc. S 10577 (daily ed. June 13,
1974).
27. Hearings on S. 316, supra note 19, at 24, 31.
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interests-a balancing approach. In the case of the day-to-day
management of wilderness areas, by giving great weight to the
purist interest,28 this balancing technique has succeeded in pro-
ducing solutions which are acceptable in terms of both parts of
the definition.2 9 But when major policy decisions on the uses
of the land are to be made, the balancing process breaks down.
The reason is that another factor enters into policy decisions, a
factor which weighs very heavily on the side of practical usage.
This factor is the multiple-use concept. Before considering its
effects on the management of wilderness areas, however, it will
be useful to review the history of the multiple-use concept with
reference to wilderness.
I. THE MULTIPLE-USE CONCEPT AND ITS IMPLICATIONS
FOR WILDERNESS MANAGEMENT
Although conservationists warmly welcomed the idea of stat-
utory protection of wilderness areas from the very first, support
among other groups was by no means unanimous. Timber and
mining interests, fearing the loss of their privileges on wilderness
lands, voiced strong opposition to the bills that were introduced
to provide this protection. ° They were joined by other groups 3 '
which felt that the creation of statutorily protected wilderness
areas would effectively bar use of these areas for their respective
special interests. Although many of these groups agreed in prin-
ciple with the idea of preserving certain areas in their natural
state, they felt that this objective should not preclude other con-
current uses of the land.3 2 Thus, in the late 1950's, in order to
win more general support for the wilderness bill, some assurance
28. See, e.g., text accompanying note 51 infra.
29. See text accompanying notes 51-63 infra.
30. See, e.g., Hearings on S. 1176, supra note 6, at 327-29 (statement
of the American Mining Congress); id. at 150-52 (statement of the Na-
tional Lumber Manufacturer's Association).
31. Recreationists were prominent among the opposition. See Hear-
ings on S. 1176, supra note 6, at 423-26 (letter from the Outboard Boating
Club of America); id. at 336 (letter from the National Forest Recreation
Association). But see id. at 401-06 (Federation of Western Outdoors
Clubs). Other groups included grazing interests, see id. at 397-401
(statement of the National Cattlemen's Association), and water develop-
ment interests, see id. at 409 (letter from the Colorado State Watershed
Conservation Association). Wildlife managers, while generally noncom-
mittal, expressed fear as to the result of improving access to wilderness
areas. Id. at 112-13 (statement of Richard Griffith, Assistant Chief,
Branch of Wildlife Refuges, Bureau of Sport Fisheries and Wildlife).
32. See, e.g., id. at 423-26 (letter from the Outboard Boating Club
of America),
1974]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
was needed that such legislation would not exclude other uses
from the protected areas.
In 1960, perhaps partly in response to the proposed wil-
derness legislation,33 the Forest Service asked Congress to give
statutory recognition to the multiple-use principle which had
been the unofficial policy of the Forest Service for many years.34
Simply stated, this principle holds that
the national forest lands will be allocated in such ways as to re-
flect demand for uses to which the lands may be put, within lim-
itations imposed by the nature of the land .... [Mjultiple use
depends only partly on the physical characteristics of the land
and equally on the uses demanded for the land.3 5
The multiple-use concept is an affirmation that lands adminis-
tered by the Forest Service will not be confined to a single use,
but rather will be utilized in such combination as to achieve the
maximum benefit for the greatest number of uses. 3 6
In response to the Forest Service request, Congress passed
the Multiple-Use and Sustained-Yield Act of 1960, 3 7 declaring
that
"Multiple use" means: The management of all the various
renewable surface resources of the national forests so that they
are utilized in the combination that will best meet the needs of
the American people; making the most judicious use of the land
for some or all of these resources ... ; that some land will be
used for less than all of the resources; and harmonious and co-
ordinated management of the various resources ... without im-
pairment of the productivity of the land, with consideration
being given to the relative values of the various resources
... *38
The statute specifies five purposes for which the national forests
may be used consistent with this definition: outdoor recreation,
33. See Hearings on H.R. 10572 Before the Subcomm. on Forests of
the House Comm. on Agriculture, 86th Cong., 2d Sess., ser. RR, at 38
(1960) (statement of Richard E. McArdle, Chief of the Forest Service);
Hearings on S. 1176, supra note 6, at 93 (statement of Richard E. Mc-
Ardle).
34. Hearings on S. 174, supra note 11, at 43 (statement of Richard
E. McArdle, Chief of the Forest Service). Many attribute this philosophy
to Gifford Pinchot, first professional forester in the United States and
Chief of the Forest Service (earlier the Division of Forestry and the Bu-
reau of Forestry) from 1898 to 1910. For a history of the development
of this concept, see OUTDOOR RECREATiON REsouRcEs REVIEW CoMM ssioN,
STUDY REPoRT No. 17, MULTIPLE USE OF LAND AND WATER AREAS 1-2(1962).
35. ORRRC STUDY REPORT 3, supra note 7, at 36.
36. See generally Hearings on H.R. 10572, supra note 33; H.R. REP.
No. 1551, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. (1960); S. REP. No. 1407, 86th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1960).
37. Pub. L. No. 86-517, 74 Stat. 215 (codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 528-31
(1970)).
38. 16 U.S.C. § 531(a) (1970).
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range, timber, watershed, and wildlife and fish purposes.39 It
specifically provides that "[t] he establishment and maintenance
of areas of wilderness are consistent with the purposes" of the
Multiple-Use Act.40  Clearly, however, the Act was intended to
negate the idea that any area of the national forests is to be
managed for any single purpose.41
Raving received this assurance, the proponents of the wil-
derness bill proceeded to incorporate the multiple-use concept in-
to their legislation in order to win the support of many of the
groups which had expressed fear of being "locked out" of the
wilderness. Senator Hubert Humphrey, one of the wilderness
bill's major supporters, declared during the 1961 hearings:
[Tihis proposal is one that respects the importance of other
programs. It is a multiple-purpose wilderness program. Every
area included in the proposed national wilderness preservation
system is now serving some other purpose, or purposes, consist-
ent with the continued protection of the area as wilderness.
Under this legislation, these areas will continue to serve these
purposes .... 42
Similar sentiments were expressed by the Chief of the Forest
Service43 and the Secretary of the Interior.44  As enacted, the
Wilderness Act thus contains the provision that "[n]othing in
this chapter shall be deemed to be in interference with the pur-
pose for which national forests are established as set forth in
... the Multiple-Use and Sustained-Yield Act .... ,,45
39. Id. § 528.
40. Id. § 529.
41. Congress, by this action [the Multiple-Use Act], made it
clear that wilderness can no longer be considered to serve only
a single use. It provides a habitat for wildlife, opportunities for
hunting, fishing, scientific research, exercise and other enjoy-
ment of the outdoors.
FOREST SRvicE, U.S. DEP'T OF AGRicumuRE, SEARCH FOR SOMuuE: OUR
WILDERNESS HERITAGE 7 (rev. 1971) [hereinafter cited as SEARCH FOR
SorLTUE].
42. Hearings on S. 174, supra note 11, at 135-36.
43. The Multiple-Use Act itself which was passed by Con-
gress in 1960 recognized that the wilderness preservation was not
incompatible with the multiple use principle. The multiple use
principle doesn't mean that all uses must occur on all lands at
the same time. It does mean that these major uses would occur
on a major area of land, probably not necessarily concurrently.
But the wilderness use does permit of hunting and fishing and
watershed protection, grazing, so that there would be multiple
uses in a wilderness area ....
Hearings on S. 4 Before the Subcomm. on Public Lands of the Senate
Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 46 (1963)
(statement of Edward Cliff, Chief of the Forest Service). See also Hear-
ings on S. 174, supra note 11, at 43, 49-50.
44. See Hearings on S. 174, supra note 11, at 19-20 (exchange be-
tween Sen. Dworshak and Secretary Udall).
45. 16 U.S.C. § 1133(a) (1) (1970).
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Certain uses, such as logging, are implicitly banned from the
wilderness as inconsistent with the idea of maintaining the land
in its natural state.46 But other active uses are expressly per-
mitted by the Act,47 and outdoor recreation is apparently viewed
as one of the major uses of wilderness land.48 The management
policies of the Forest Service reflect this idea that wilderness
land is to be managed on a multiple-use basis. 49 One Forest
Service publication states, "Multiple use management, then, is
providing this generation of Americans with optimum opportuni-
ties for wilderness recreation. And for the benefit of those gen-
erations of Americans yet to come, it is making certain that these
46. The Act nowhere specifically bans logging, but presumably log-
ging would destroy the "wilderness character" which the Act requires
be preserved. 16 U.S.C. § 1133(b) (1970). Cf. Parker v. United States,
309 F. Supp. 593 (D. Colo. 1970), aff'd, 448 F.2d 793 (10th Cir. 1971),
cert. denied, 405 U.S. 989 (1972). The following subsection, 16 U.S.C.
§ 1133(c), prohibits commercial enterprises and roads, and this would
seem to preclude logging. However, logging is permitted in the Boundary
Waters Canoe Area (BWCA) in Minnesota, id. § 1133(d) (5), consistent
with its status as a "semi-wilderness". See note 113 infra. But much of
this logging has recently been enjoined. Minnesota Public Interest Re-
search Group v. Butz, 358 F. Supp. 584 (D. Minn. 1973), afid 498 F.2d
1314 (8th Cir. 1974) (injunction issued under the National Environmental
Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. § 4321 et seq. (1970), until completion of
an environmental impact statement by the Forest Service), prelim. in-
junction granted on other grounds, No. 4-72-Civil-598 (D. Minn., Sept. 18,
1974) (injunction issued until a trial on the merits and a final de-
termination by the court of the plaintiff's challenge to the adequacy
of the completed impact statement, FOREST SERvicE, U.S. DEP'T OF Aa-
RICuLTURE, BouNiARY WATERS CANOE AREA MANAGEVENT PLA- AND
ENV oNMENTAL STATEMENT (1974), and of the claim that logging is pro-
hibited in the BWCA by the provisions of the Wilderness Act).
47. For example, the Act provides for the continuance of grazing
established prior to September 3, 1964, under reasonable regulations
established by the Secretary of Agriculture. 16 U.S.C. § 1133(d)(4)
(1970). For a discussion of the ambiguity in this provision, see McClos-
key, The Wilderness Act of 1964: Its Background and Meaning, 45 ORE.
L. Rsv. 288 (1966). Wildlife management, 16 U.S.C. § 1133(d) (8)
(1970), and the development of water resources, id. § 1133(d) (4), (7),
are also specifically mentioned.
48. Id. § 1133(b).
49. See 36 C.F.R. § 293.2 (1973); FOREST SmaivcE MANUAL § 2322.12
[hereinafter cited as FSM]. The National Park Service, however, rejects
the multiple-use mandate as inapplicable to national park wilderness.
NATIONAL PARK SERVIcE, U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIoR, ADvINISTRATIVE
PoLIcrEs FOR NATURAL AREAS OF THE NATIONAL PARK SYSTEm 55 (rev.
1968) [hereinafter cited as NPS]. This rejection is based on the Wilder-
ness Act itself, which provides in part that
the designation of any area of any park . . . as a wilderness area
pursuant to this Act shall in no manner lower the standards
evolved for the use and preservation of such park.
16 U.S.C. § 1133 (a) (3) (1970),
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irreplaceable wilderness lands shall endure."5 0  This statement
expresses the essence of multiple-use management of wilderness
lands: present use for recreation and other purposes, and preser-
vation for the future.
Thus, the management philosophy of multiple-use was im-
pressed upon the concept of wilderness by statutory mandate.
In that action Congress strongly reinforced the idea of wilder-
ness as an area which is to be used-the concept embodied in
the practical half of the dual definition. The multiple-use phi-
losophy is not as consistent with the other half of that defini-
tion, however. The purist approach emphasizes the preservation
of certain lands in their natural state, undisturbed and unaltered
by man; the multiple-use concept, while also endorsing preser-
vation of those lands, contemplates active management of the
land to achieve the optimum benefit to the American people.
A management philosophy based on multiple-use would there-
fore seem to lead to preservation in a less than natural state if
this is necessary in order to promote the greatest overall
benefit. Ironically, it is this threat which originally prompted
the move to give statutory protection to wilderness lands.
The recognition given to the multiple-use philosophy in the
Wilderness Act has therefore made it very likely that in any
given case the balance between the purity of wilderness and the
practical use of land will be tipped in favor of the latter. In
ordinary management decisions, however, even the multiple-use
mandate does not seriously threaten the values of the purist.
This is so for at least two reasons. First, the multiple-use
theory does not clearly mandate one course of management
action over another so long as the course chosen does not pro-
hibit multiple use of the wilderness land. Therefore, the admin-
istering agencies have in practice given heavy weight to the sanc-
tity of the wilderness. For example, a Forest Service publication
states:
The dominant theme and intent of the Wilderness Act is to
insure an enduring resource of wilderness for the Nation.
For the Forest Service, this means that protection and ad-
vancement of wilderness values must be given priority in many
decisions that are made day by day ....
It means that such "non-conforming uses" as the Act au-
thorized must be conducted in such a manner that they have only
a minimum effect on the wilderness resource.51
50. FOREST SERVIcE, U.S. DEP'T or AGRIcULTURE, WirnERNss 12
(1967) [hereinafter cited as WLDERNESS].
51. SEARcH FOR SOLrruD, supra note 41, at 8-9.
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The Forest Service has been so careful in this regard that it has
been criticized for its "purist" position, which has resulted, for
example, in extreme reluctance to allow a helicopter to be used
to remove the body of a hiker killed during a wilderness storm.52
A second reason to discount the multiple-use threat to purist
values is that the problems encountered in the context of ordi-
nary management decisions are relatively minor. A decision in
favor of either the purist or the practical approach, while pos-
sibly of great theoretical significance, does not significantly
threaten the other. An excellent example of the effect of this
type of decision is the problem of the use and control of fire
in the wilderness.
The fact that naturally occurring fires would have burned
uncontrolled in a wilderness where man had never ventured
has been thought to present the question of whether natural fires
and even fires caused by people should be controlled on modern
wilderness lands.53 A related problem is whether controlled
burning should be used within the wilderness to thin the forest
and allow new growth.54 The Wilderness Act leaves the former
problem to the discretion of the Secretary of Agriculture, but
it is silent on the question of controlled burning.r5 Presumably
the administering agency could also permit controlled burning
,by classifying it as a fire control tool, however, since without
it, deadwood and other dry material could build up in the forest
and present the danger of a very destructive fire.
The purist would argue that since a wilderness is a place
where man's influence is not present, there should be no control
of fire and no prescribed burning. The practicalist, however,
would say that wilderness fires should be fought in order to pre-
serve the scenic beauty of the wilderness which makes it
uniquely valuable for recreation56 and also to reduce the danger
to adjacent non-wilderness lands.57 For the same reasons the
52. Hearings on S. 316, supra note 19, at 29.
53. See, e.g., Leopold, Ecological Requirements of the Wilderness
Act, in WmDERNEss Am THE QuA=rrY OF Lw 188-90 (1969).
54. See, e.g., Beard, Plants and Animals in Natural Communities,
in VoicEs FOR TmE Wn.nEuNEss 215, 222-23 (W. Schwartz ed. 1969); Discus-
sion, in Voics FOR THE WMIDERNESS, supra, at 232-35; Leopold, supra note
53, at 192-97; Heinselman, Preserving Nature in Forested Wilderness
Areas and National Parks, 44 NAT'r PARKS & CONS. MAG., Sept., 1970,
at 8.
55. 16 U.S.C. § 1133(d) (1) (1970). See also 36 C.F.R. § 293.3
(1974).
56. See, e.g., Leopold, supra note 53, at 190.
57. See Hearings on S. 1176 Before the Subcomm. on Public Lands
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practicalist would favor prescribed burning. Whichever way the
agency decides this question, however, the decision will not
seriously threaten the values held by either the purist or the
practicalist. The purist, although favoring the absence of fire
control, would not find his "wilderness experience" interrupted
if fire control is carried on in a manner consistent with the na-
ture of wilderness;68 the result would be essentially the same
as if the fire had never started. Similarly, prescribed burning
is as close to a natural method of thinning forests as can be
found. The practicalist, on the other hand, while favoring fire
control and prescribed burning, would not find himself excluded
from the wilderness if they are not practiced; the upholding of
purist values in this respect would not interfere with the mul-
tiple-use of the land. The possibility of a particularly devastat-
ing fire which could ruin the wilderness as a recreation area may
be sufficient reason to adopt the more practical approach, how-
ever. In fact, the Forest Service has approved the use of both
fire control measures and controlled burning, with certain modi-
fications "to meet the special management objectives of each indi-
vidual wilderness." 59
Similar questions have been raised concerning insect and
disease control,60 the administrative use of motorized vehicles
and equipment, 61 the use of helicopters to place and check scien-
tific instruments,62 and even the possible eradication of non-
of the Senate Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 85th Cong., 1st Sess.
95 (1957) (statement of Richard E. McArdle, Chief of the Forest Serv-
ice).
58. This is the requirement of the Forest Service. FSM supra note
49, § 2324.21-.23.
59. FSM, supra note 49, § 2324.2. The Forest Service allows its nor-
mal fire suppression policies to be used on wilderness land with neces-
sary modifications consistent with the character of the wilderness. Con-
trolled burning can be used, subject to the approval of the Chief. See
also NPS, supra note 49, at 56, allowing fire control "as necessary to pre-
vent unacceptable loss of wilderness values, loss of life, damage to prop-
erty, and the spread of wildlife to lands outside the wilderness." The
National Park Service does approve of prescribed burning on natural
areas, see id., at 17, and presumably this policy also would apply to
wilderness.
60. See Hearings on S. 1176, supra note 57, at 95 (statement of Rich-
ard E. McArdle, Chief of the Forest Service); FSM, supra note 49,
§ 2324.1; NPS, supra note 49, at 56.
61. See, e.g., Cliff, The Wilderness Act and the National Forests, in
WILDERNESS AND THE QUALITY OF LIFE 6, 10-11 (1969). See also FSM,
supra note 49, § 2326; NPS, supra note 49, at 56, 58.
62. Cliff, supra note 61, at 11; FSM, supra note 49, § 2326.12; NPS,
supre note 49, at 56. Cf. FSM, supra note 49, §§ 2323.43-.44, detailing
the Forest Service's policy on scientific research and weather modifica-
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native plants and animals so as to more closely approximate the
"natural condition of the land.16 3 Like the fire problem, these
all require the exercise of agency discretion to strike a balance
between the purist and the practicalist theories of wilderness
management. The theoretical implications of each decision are
strong, for it is in this manner that the statutory definition is
given substance. The practical implications, however, are minor.
The differences in the long-run character of the wilderness where
a helicopter rather than a man on foot is used to check a snow
gauge, or where chain saws rather than hand axes are used to
clear a trail, are so slight as to be insignificant. A visitor to
the wilderness might have his solitude disturbed momentarily
by use of a helicopter or a chain saw, thereby making it impor-
tant to consider available alternatives, but the ultimate character
of the area would not be noticeably affected.
When, however, the question involves not day-to-day admin-
istration but rather the determination of basic policy as to the
permissible degree of intrusion by one or another of the uses
sanctioned by the Wilderness Act, the statutory policy of multi-
ple-use clearly favors the practical half of the wilderness defini-
tion at the expense of purity. Major disruptions of the wilder-
ness character may be permitted under the statutes in order to
further a nonconforming use. One such disruption is that of
recreational overuse, which has created a serious problem for
wilderness management.
III. MANAGEMENT PROBLEMS AND ATTEMPTED
SOLUTIONS
Basic guidance for the management of wilderness areas is
given by the Wilderness Act itself. In an explicit reference to
the Multiple-Use Act, the Wilderness Act declares that there is
no conflict between the two;64 it then specifically states a mul-
tiple-use management policy:
Except as otherwise provided in this chapter, each agency ad-
ministering any area designated as wilderness shall be re-
sponsible for preserving the wilderness character of the area
tion over wilderness lands. Although the wilderness may be used for
scientific purposes, it must be under circumstances which will preserve
the wilderness environment. Weather modification is permitted where
the effects are temporary and compatible with the wilderness appear-
ance.
63. See Heinselman, supra note 54, at 13; NPS, supra note 49, at
56.
64. See note 40 supra and accompanying text.
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and shall so administer such area for such other purposes for
which it may have been established as also to preserve its
wilderness character. Except as otherwise provided in this chap-
ter, wilderness areas shall be devoted to the public purposes of
recreational, scenic, scientific, educational, conservation, and
historical use.65
Having established a basic management policy of multiple-use,
the Act goes on to impose a number of specific prohibitions de-
signed to adapt the multiple-use concept to the management of
a wilderness area.66 The prohibited activities include commercial
enterprises, construction of permanent roads, and the use, beyond
minimum administrative and emergency needs, 67 of motor ve-
hicles, motorized equipment, motorboats, aircraft, temporary
roads, and other structures and instaflations. Within this broad
outline of wilderness protection, the Act makes certain excep-
tions which appear to be designed either to legitimize established
uses or to promote the multiple-use development of the protected
land. Falling within the first category are provisions which
allow mineral interests to remain in effect 8 and established graz-
65. 16 U.S.C. § 1133(b) (1970). See also 36 C.F.R. § 293.2 (1973).
66. 16 U.S.C. § 1133(c) (1970). See also 36 C.F.R. § 293.6, 293.8
(1973).
67. 16 U.S.C. § 1133(c) (1970). See also 36 C.F.R. § 293.6(c)
(1973); FSM, supra note 49, § 2326; NPS, supra note 49, at 56, 58.
68. 16 U.S.C. § 1133 (d) (3) (1970). This section provides that the
mining laws of the United States shall extend to wilderness lands until
December 31, 1983, subject to the reasonable regulations of the Secretary
of Agriculture. Rights existing before September 31, 1964, are appar-
ently unaffected by this provision, but those which come into effect be-
tween 1964 and 1983 are subject to this provision. No rights can be cre-
ated after 1983. See also 36 C.F.R. § 293.14 (1973); FSM, supra note 49,
§ 2320.3 (8) (d); NPS, supra note 49, at 57 (mining end prospecting pres-
ent in an area proposed for designation as wilderness required to be
phased out before designation, or excluded when drawing the boundaries
thereof).
It was reported in 1973 that there were 2,600 claims staked on na-
tional forest wilderness lands. No claims, however, had been patented
since the passage of the Wilderness Act, nor were there any producing
mines-and only two mines capable of production-within wilderness
boundaries. Hearings on S. 1010 Before the Subcomm. on Minerals, Ma-
terials, and Fuels of the Senate Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs,
93d Cong., 1st Sess. 60 (1973) (statement of the Chief of the Forest Serv-
ice).
There have been several attempts to protect wilderness further
against mining and prospecting. In Izaak Walton League v. St. Clair,
353 F. Supp. 698 (D. MAinn. 1973), which was brought by conservationists
seeking an injunction against mineral activity in the Boundary Waters
Canoe Area (BWCA), Judge Neville held that the mineral rights provi-
sions of the Wilderness Act are contrary to its wilderness objectives and
that the latter of necessity override the former. The court therefore en-joined lessors and lessees of mineral interests in the BWCA from carry-
ing on exploratory or other mineral 4ctivity. This result, however, was
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ing6 9 and use of aircraft or motorboats 70 to continue. In the sec-
ond category are exceptions for continued prospecting and the
initiation of new mineral claims;71 state programs to control
hunting, fishing, and water resources;72 water-related projects
such as power plants and reservoirs authorized by the Presi-
dent; 73 and commercial activities which "are proper for realizing
the recreational or other wilderness purposes of the areas. '74
The result of this collage of policy, prohibitions, and excep-
tions is that an administering agency has a great deal of discre-
tion with regard to the activities and improvements which it can
allow on wilderness lands. Almost any activity that the Forest
Service may decide to permit could arguably be brought within
one or another of the exceptions. Although the scope of the ex-
ceptions has received little attention in the courts (probably be-
reversed on appeal and remanded with directions that the Forest Service
be allowed to determine, upon proper application, whether a prospecting
permit should be granted. 497 F.2d 849 (8th cir.), cert. denied, 43
U.S.L.W. 3274 (U.S. Nov. 12, 1974).
Efforts to legislate protection have also been made. See S. 1010, 93d
Cong., 1st Sess. (1973). The mineral dispute in the BWCA and Judge
Neville's district court opinion in St. Clair, supra, were both cited as mo-
tivation for this bill, which would amend the Wilderness Act to terminate
the application of all mining and mineral laws to wilderness land and
to stop further prospecting. The Forest Service opposes this legislation,
preferring instead S. 1040, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973). That bill, offered
by the Administration, would provide a general revision of the mining
laws, allowing the federal government to control mineral activity on all
public land (including wilderness) through a leasing system. The ra-
tionale of the Forest Service is consistent with its multiple-use wilder-
ness philosophy:
Because of the special values of these [wilderness] lands, we be-
lieve we should be in a position to weigh other resource values
and needs, including mineral development, before new private
mineral rights are perfected. Most of these mineral rights, by
their very nature, are inconsistent with wilderness protection.
The new leasing system we propose will provide the authority
needed to balance wilderness and mineral values.
Hearings on S. 1010, supra, at 56 (statement of the Chief of the Forest
Service).
69. 16 U.S.C. § 1133(d) (4) (1970). See also 36 C.F.R. § 293.7(1973); FSM, supra note 49, § 2320.3 (8) (a); cf. NPS, supra note 49, at 18
(grazing not permitted on National Park Service wilderness).
70. 16 U.S.C. § 1133(d) (1) (1970). See also 36 C.F.R. § 293.6(d)
(1973); FSM, supra note 49, § 2326.1; NPS, supra note 49, at 57.
71. 16 U.S.C. § 1133(d)(3) (1970). See also 36 C.F.R. § 293.15(1973); FSM, supra note 49, § 2323.7; NPS, supra note 49, at 43; note
68 supra.
72. 16 U.S.C. § 1133 (d) (7)- (8) (1970). See also 36 C.F.R. § 293.10,
293.11 (1973).
73. 16 U.S.C. § 1133(d) (4) (1970).
74. 16 U.S.C. § 1133 (d) (6) (1970). See also FSM, supra note 49,§ 2320.3 (6) (c) ; NPS, supra note 49, at 57.
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cause the strict interpretation given to them by the Forest Serv-
ice has provoked little controversy), recent cases indicate that
the wide latitude given to the agencies by the Act is judicially
reviewable.75 For the present, however, the day-to-day manage-
ment of wilderness areas appears committed to agency discre-
tion.76
The fact that the agencies have wide discretion in deciding
what activities and improvements are to be permitted on wilder-
ness lands does not mean that it extends to deciding what uses
may be made of the land. There is a difference between the
ability to decide the purposes for which the land may be used
and the ability to regulate the manner in which a permissible
purpose is carried out. Although the agencies have wide discre-
tion in the latter area, the former is virtually closed to them.
75. Judicial review may be justified on at least two theories. In
Minnesota Public Interest Research Group v. Butz, 358 F. Supp. 584 (D.
Minn. 1973), affd 498 F.2d 1314 (8th Cir. 1974), the court enjoined a
number of management decisions to allow timber cutting in the Bound-
ary Waters Canoe Area on the theory that these actions, taken as a
whole, constituted a major federal action significantly affecting the qual-
ity of the human environment and as such required an environmental
impact statement on the management plan for the area. Because sub-
stantive review as well as procedural review is now thought to be possi-
ble under the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §
4321 et seq. (1970), see, e.g., Environmental Defense Fund v. Corps of
Eng'rs, 470 F.2d 289 (8th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 931 (1973),
this may be one means of obtaining judicial review of a management
decision. A second way of obtaining judicial review might have been
opened by the district court decision in Izaak Walton League v. St. Clair,
353 F. Supp. 698 (D. Minn. 1973), wherein the court enjoined mineral
exploration in the Boundary Waters Canoe Area as incompatible with
the concept of wilderness preservation under the Wilderness Act. Broad
dicta in the opinion could provide a basis for arguing that other manage-
ment actions, even if expressly permitted by the Act, are inconsistent
with the idea of wilderness: "[I]f the area is to remain true wilderness,
there is no reasonable usage to which the surface can be put and still
retain the area's character as wilderness." Id. at 715. On appeal, how-
ever, the court held that while the construction of the Wilderness Act
is a legal issue cognizable in the courts, questions regarding both the
effect of mining upon the wilderness and the adequacy of restrictions
designed to preserve wilderness quality are ones of fact, properly within
the competence of the Forest Service under the doctrine of primary juris-
diction. 497 F.2d 849, 852-53 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 43 U.S.L.W. 3274
(U.S. Nov. 12, 1974). The case was reversed and remanded with instruc-
tions that the Forest Service be allowed to determine whether a mining
permit should be issued. Id. at 853. There remains a possibility that
the district court's theory will survive despite the reversal. A recent
case makes the argument that certain logging activities within the
BWCA are incompatible with the concept of wilderness preservation. See
Minnesota Public Interest Research Group v. Butz, No. 4-72-Civil-598 (D.
Minn., Sept. 18, 1974) (preliminary injunction issued).
76. See text accompanying notes 51-63 supra.
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The multiple-use mandate in the statute prevents the agency
from completely excluding certain uses of the land even if it
should decide that exclusion would be in the best interests of
the area.
An example of this dilemma which now faces wilderness
managers is the threat of recreational overuse. The fact that
recreational use of the wilderness area not only affects the per-
ception of the wilderness by its visitors but also menaces the
long-term survival of the wilderness resource is complicated
greatly by the fact that under the Act recreation seems clearly
designated as a major intended use of the protected lands.7 7
Even before the Wilderness Act was passed, the ORRRC ob-
served:
Public agencies apparently administer wilderness areas on
the principle that recreation, among all wilderness values,
should be predominant.... Budgetary increases for adminis-
tration of wilderness and other lands suitable for recreation seem
to be based primarily on expanding amounts of recreational use,
and other values of wilderness--including abstract benefits
available in limited recreational use-are difficult to defend in
current administration. The public interest is often evaluated
in terms of use statistics. The trend is to encourage more rec-
reational use even in wilderness areas now heavily used; often
deliberately, but sometimes unwittingly, through trail improve-
ments, facility developments, and peripheral road extensions. 8
Although the managing agencies have certainly become more
aware of this problem in recent years and have taken certain
77. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 1131(c)(2), 1133(b), 1133(d) (6) (197G).
78. ORRRC SmUDY REPORT 3, supra note 7, at 298. Earlier in the
same report, the Commission expanded on this idea:
In most instances, agencies responsible for management of wil-
derness tracts have recognized the need for special forms of rec-
reational management. Less often, however, have they recog-
nized the need to manage wilderness lands-especially for their
biology-for maintenance of wilderness environments which are
essential for provision of all wilderness values. Partly this is a
reflection of fragmentized authority; but mainly it results from
the fact that personnel with on-the-ground responsibilities gen-
eraly have training and experience--and concepts which spring
from these factors-oriented toward the management of land for
commercial resources and for mass recreation rather than for the
retention of wilderness values....
A further management tendency inconsistent with wilder-
ness concepts is to view wilderness almost exclusively as a rec-
reational resource. The other rather abstract values, which are
only incidentally related to wilderness recreation, are often
neglected-principally because of their very abstract nature. In
turn, wilderness resources tend to be manipulated along conven-
tional recreation management lines. Such management has the
effect of diluting the unique environmental characteristics which
distinguish wilderness resgurceo,
14, qt 14,
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steps to correct it,79 the emphasis on recreation persists. The
Forest Service and the National Park Service both have tended
to deal with wilderness in recreational terms,8 0 to publicize its
recreational attributes,8 ' and to encourage recreational use of the
wilderness by laying out trails and publishing maps.8 2 The agen-
cies have not been alone in their view of wilderness as a recrea-
tion area: they have been joined not only by timber interests8 3
and members of Congress, 84 -but also by many if not most conser-
vationists.85 This is not to say that these groups support unregu-
lated use of wilderness for recreation, but rather that they sup-
port recreation in keeping with the character of wilderness. The
fundamental problem may 'be, however, that management for
recreation may be as destructive to the wilderness experience as
recreational overuse is to the wilderness resource.
Much of the damage from recreational overuse is obvious.
In the words of Roderick Nash, wilderness is in danger of being
"loved out of existence."8' 6 Since 1945, wilderness-type recreation
has grown by more than 1200 percent;8 7 in 1970, wilderness visi-
tation was estimated to have doubled over the past decade, and
was projected to increase ten times by the year 2000.88 In the
Boundary Waters Canoe Area of Minnesota, one of the most
heavily used wilderness areas, use increased 31 percent from 1969
79. See text accompanying notes 99-108 infra.
80. See, e.g., Hearings on H.R. 9070 and Related Bills Before the
Subcomm. on Public Lands of the House Comm. on Interior and Insular
Affairs, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., ser. 15, pt. 4, at 1107 (1964) (statement of
Secretary Udall); Hearings on S. 1176 Before the Subcomm. on Public
Lands of the Senate Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 93d Cong.,
1st Sess. 98-99, 104 (1957) (statement of the Chief of the Forest Service).
81. See, e.g., FOREST SERvICE, U.S. DEP'T OF AGRICULTURE, NATIONAL
FOREST WILDERNESSES AND PnmvmnE AREAs (1974); SEARCH FOR SOLITUE,
supra note 41; WILDERNESS, supra note 50.
82. See SEARCH FOR SOLITUDE, supra note 41, at 11.
83. See, e.g., Hearings on S. 316 Before the Subcomm. on Public
Lands of the Senate Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 93d Cong.,
1st Sess., pt. 1, at 208 (1973) (statement of the American Pulpwood As-
sociation).
84. See, e.g., Hearings on S. 4028 Before the Subcomm. on Public
Lands of the Senate Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 85th Cong.,
2d Sess., pt. 1, at 35 (1958) (statement of Sen. Neuberger).
85. See, e.g., Brower, Foreword to VOICES FOR THE WLnDERNESs, su-
pra note 54, at vii (Sierra Club); Hearings on H.R. 9070, supra note 80,
at 1195 (statement of the Wilderness Society).
86. R. NASH, WmDERmss Am THE AmCAN MInD 264 (rev. ed.
1973).
87. Hearings on S. 316, supra note 83, at 17 (statement of Sen.
McGee).
88. NASH, supra note 86, at 203,
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to 1970.89 The results of this heavy recreational use are unfortu-
nately predictable: polluted water,90 destruction of the vegeta-
tive cover, 91 littering.92 Another result of overuse, although
harder to measure, 93 can also be anticipated. This is dilution
of the atmosphere essential to the wilderness experience. As
ecologist Stanley A. Cain has remarked, "[Ilnnumerable people
cannot enjoy solitude together."94 If wilderness is a place "where
man ... is a visitor who does not remain,"95 it may be less a
wilderness when one meets another human being or groups of
them at periodic intervals. At some point each individual ceases
to feel that he is in a wilderness, and at that point, for him,
the wilderness ceases to exist.
Recreational overuse, therefore, poses a great threat to the
"purist" concept of wilderness as well as a lesser, but still sig-
nificant, danger to even the "recreational" wilderness; in the lat-
ter case, the physical threat to the resource is of primary impor-
tance, while in the former both this and the threat to the visi-
tor's perception of his experience are important. Recognizing the
tendency to attach a disproportionately greater weight to recrea-
tion in the context of the multiple-use theory, one would predict
that proposed solutions to the problem of recreational overuse
would concentrate on protection of the physical resource, would
be applied only when recreational use reaches the point of per-
manent physical damage to that resource, and would be impaired
by simultaneous promotions of wilderness recreation. In fact,
this prediction has been realized.
Proposed solutions to the recreational overuse problem all
tend to begin with the idea of "carrying capacity,"'96 which de-
89. Gilbert, Peterson, & Lime, Toward a Model of Travel Behavior
in the Boundary Waters Canoe Area, 4 ENViRONTENT AND BEHAvioR 131,
132 (1972).
90. See Merriam, Goeckermann, Bloemendal & Costello, A Progress
Report on the Condition of Newly Established Campsites in the Bound-
ary Waters Canoe Area 3 (Minn. Forestry Research Note No. 232, 1971).
91. See ORRRC Sun=Y REPORT 3, supra note 7, at 301; McCool, Mer-
riam & Cushwa, The Condition of Wilderness Campsites in the Bound-
ary Waters Canoe Area (Minn. Forestry Research Note No. 202, 1969);
Frissell & Duncan, Campsite Preference and Deterioration in the
Quetico-Superior Canoe Country, 63 J. FoREsTRY 256 (1964).
92. See ORRRC STUny REPORT 3, supra note 7, at 301.
93. See generally Fisher & Krutilla, Determination of Optimal Ca-
pacity of Resource-Based Recreation Facilities, 12 NATURAL REsouRcEs J.
417 (1972); Lime, Research for Determining Use Capacities of the Bound-
ary Waters Canoe Area, 21 NATmA iST, Winter, 1970, at 9-13.
94. Quoted in NASH, supra note 86, at 264.
95. 16 U.S.C. § 1131(c) (1970).
96. See generally the authorities cited in note 93 supra.
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fines the "maximum level of use that does not cause unaccept-
able levels or kinds of ecological damage or user dissatisfac-
tion.10 7  Thus formulated, the concept has two elements-the
level at which the use of the land begins to damage the physical
resource, and the level at which the wilderness experience of the
users of the land becomes adversely affected. Presumably
whichever of these two levels is reached first would determine
the maximum level of use for a particular area. Both of these
elements are difficult to quantify, and the "carrying capacity"
of the land is therefore usually determined by a subjective evalu-
ation of the physical damage to the ecology.9 8 The more abstract
values of wilderness are generally not considered.
Various proposals have been made for keeping land within
its carrying capacity. One possible solution would be to accom-
modate the increased demand by adding more wilderness land
to the system. This alternative is potentially unsatisfactory,
however, since even by the estimates of conservationists only
about two percent of the nation's land area would qualify.99
Even if all of this land were committed to wilderness purposes,
demand might still exceed supply. In addition, there is the diffi-
cult economic question of whether the incremental value of an
additional acre of wilderness is greater than the incremental
value of that land put to some other use.10
Other proposals would control the use of wilderness areas
by any one of a number of methods, including redistribution of
visitors to less crowded zones,10 requirement of advance reserva-
97. Gilbert, Peterson & Lime, supra note 89, at 136.
98. This observation is based on discussions and correspondence
with a number of people involved in planning for recreational use of
wilderness areas. See, e.g., National Park Service Extends Backcountry
Protection Plan, Department of the Interior News Release (June 24,
1973); Letter from Robert W. Rogers, Acting Superintendent of Isle Roy-
ale National Park, to Mark C. Peterson, November 29, 1973 on file in the
Univ. of Minn. Law Library; Telephone call to Carl Westrate, Recreation
Management Division of Forest Service Region Five, from Mark C. Peter-
son, November 26, 1973.
99. Gilligan, Welcoming Address, in WLDERNFss AND THE QuALrr
or LIFE 2 (1969).
100. See generally M. CLAWSON & J. KNETSCH, THE EcoNoMIcS OF
OUTnoon RECnATION (1966); ORRRC STuDy REPORT 3, supra note 7, at
ch. 6; Hines, Wilderness: Economic Choice, Values and the Androscog-
gin, in WLDERNEss AND TH QUALiTy OF LIFE 74-80 (1969); Hughes, Wil-
derness and Economics, 66 J. FoRsTRY 855 (1968); Robinson, Wilderness:
The Last Frontier, 59 MIN. L. Rnv. 1 (1974).
101. See Gilbert, Peterson, & Lime, supra note 89, at 135-36. The
Forest Service recommends this as a possible system of use rationing.
FSM, supra note 49, § 2323.12(c). Direct methods of dispersion include
zoning, campsite permits, and roving rangers to channel traffic to less
heavily used areas. Indirect methods include information provided to
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tions,'10 2 regulation of the rate at which persons enter the wil-
derness or the duration of their stay, 0 3 or direct limitations on
the number of people allowed in each area. The latter sugges-
tion could be implemented by the use of admission fees, set at
a rate high enough to reduce the demand,10 4 by admission on
visitors as to the best areas to visit or camp, improvement of access and
addition of rustic improvements to make lightly used areas more attrac-
tive, and removal of such improvements in heavily used areas. The indi-
rect methods seem preferabl% inasmuch as they require no enforcement,
respect the quality of the wilderness experience, and preserve individual
freedom of choice.
The basis for a dispersal program could be the three '"management
situations" presently recognized by the Forest Service in each wilderness.
The first "situation" is presented by the really remote land which is pref-
erably inaccessible even by horse or mule. Here the Service recom-
mends no improvements-not even trails-which could encourage visi-
tors. The second "situation" is that of the bulk of typical wilderness
land, in which there may be trails, signs, primitive campsites, and sani-
tation structures. It is within this second area that most dispersion
would take place. The third "situation" is presented by buffer zones,
which are better situated for hourly and one-day, rather than overnight,
use. FSM, supra note 49, § 2322.12. If the Service were able to ascertain
the needs and plans of each visitor, it could channel him directly into
one of these zones or possibly even into a specific area within one of
the zones, or information could be furnished to him so that he could
choose the best area for his needs.
The drawback to this form of use control is that if use becomes too
heavy, even dispersion cannot reduce it to an acceptable level That this
has evidently become the case in several wilderness areas is confirmed
by the more drastic rationing measures now in effect in those areas. See
notes 107-108 infra and accompanying text.
102. See I. COWAN, WnIDERNESs-CONCEPT, FUNCTION, AND MANAGE-
AmNT 30 (1968); Gilbert, Peterson, & Lime, supra note 89, at 135-36. Res-
ervations are often used in combination with rationing. See notes 104-
106 infra.
103. See Gilbert, Peterson, & Lime, supra note 89, at 135-36. "Flow-
metering," or selective regulation of the rate at which people enter
through various access points, has certain disadvantages. For example,
the use might be so heavy as to effectively exclude people from the wil-
derness; at that point the system becomes a first-come-first-served ra-
tioning system. Also, such a system provides very little control over
where people go once they are inside the wilderness-they may congre-
gate near a particularly scenic point, especially in a small wilderness
area.A different type of regulation places a limit on the length of time
a visitor can spend in the wilderness or at a particular campsite. This
is a more acceptable form of visitor control than flow-metering in that
it eliminates "waiting at the door," but it may tend to drive inexperi-
enced wilderness users deep into the wilderness faster. Also, in an espe-
cially heavy use period, such as a long summer holiday weekend, the
great influx of visitors within a short time span might defeat the purpose
of the plan. These restrictions are permitted by FSM, supra note 49,
§ 2323.12(c).
104. See ORRRC STUDY REPORT 3, supra note 7, at 253-54. The possi-
bility of charging entrance fees at most national forest wilderness areas
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a first-come-first-served basis,105 or by admission based on "qual-
ifications such as physical condition, preparedness, or ability to
appreciate the wilderness."'106 In several areas such plans are
already in effect. For example, the Forest Service has instituted
a first-come-first-served plan at two heavily used Western wil-
dernesses' 0 7 and the National Park Service has expanded its 1972
seems remote, however. The Forest Service Manual restricts the charg-
ing of entrance fees to National Recreation Areas administered by the
Forest Service, allowing no entrance fee to be charged at any other na-
tional forest area. FSM, supra note 49, § 2331.2. Special-user fees do
not appear to be barred where "substantial investments have been made
in facilities for the exclusive use of an individual or group, or where
special services are provided at public expense." Id. § 2331.23. But the
very nature of a wilderness area would seem to preclude fees for these
types of services. A recent amendment to the Land and Water Conser-
vation Fund Act, 78 Stat. 897 (1965) (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 4601-4 to 11
(1970)), makes it impossible to charge user fees at national forest wil-
derness areas by requiring such highly developed facilities as flush toilets
before such fees can be charged. 16 U.S.C.A. § 4601-6a(b) (1974).
The possibility of special legislation by Congress to provide a fee
system for regulating uae of wilderness areas therefore seems slight.
During hearings on possible amendments to the Land and Water Conser-
vation Fund Act, supra, which provides the authority for charging fees
on federal recreation lands, the Senate committee rejected any idea that
fee collections should be used to limit usage of the areas. See Hearings
on S. 1893 and Related Bills Before the Subcomm. on Parks and Recrea-
tion of the Senate Comm. on Interior and Insular Affdirs, 92d Cong., 1st
Sess., pt. 1, at 59 (1971). Senator Church of Idaho observed that meth-
ods were available to control and regulate the use of public lands other
than admission fees, which would be tantamount to a tax. The commit-
tee was especially hostile to the possibility that the Administration's pro-
posed individual annual permit for entrance into the various federal
lands that do charge admission fees might become a basis for charging
admission at wilderness areas. See id. at 68-69.
105. See PuBLc LAND LAw REviEw CoMMIssIoN, ONE Tnn oF THE
NATION's LAND 206-07 (1970). This method, which is the one used by
the agencies at present, see notes 107-08 infra and accompanying text,
generally favors the early riser and the person who lives nearby. Thus
it is best combined with some sort of reservation system. Because it
gives each person a reasonably fair chance of getting into the wilderness,
however, this system is probably the most equitable, even though it re-
stricts freedom of choice.
106. See ORRRC STUDY REPORT 3, supra note 7, at 302. Besides being
vulnerable to charges of making the wilderness "elitist," such a plan
would pose great practical problems of development and application.
See generally Robinson, supra note 100, at 62-63. The judgments, espe-
cially on ability to appreciate, would necessarily be subjective. Finally,
studies tend to disprove the idea that any particular class of the popula-
tion is physically unfit for wilderness recreation. See, e.g., ORRRC
STUDY REPORT 3, supra note 7, at 130-31.
107. The plan was originally begun in 1971 in the San Gorgonio and
San Jacinto wildernesses in the San Bernadino National Forest, but was
used only for better user contact and to gather information until 1973,
when it was transformed into a rationing system. Both areas then re-
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permit program to a number of major parks across the nation,
including wilderness areas within the parks. 0 8 To the extent
that the promotion of wilderness areas continues, however, it cre-
ates increased demand for wilderness recreation and the effect
of use restrictions is thus counteracted.
The effect of these plans is not yet clear, although they have
been well received by the public.1 °9 To a certain extent, how-
ever, any rationing system is unfair;" 0 and protests may be
forthcoming as more and more people are turned away from wil-
derness areas which they have been encouraged to visit by the
advertising of both agencies and conservationists. Such protests,
if widespread, could threaten the entire Wilderness System.
More basically, the idea of regulated access is in itself incompat-
ible with the idea of wilderness as a natural and unrestricted
area. If no other alternative is available, then such controls may
be necessary; but before that point is reached other measures,
more consistent with wilderness preservation, should be con-
sidered.
IV. A PROPOSED REMEDY
The solutions which have thus far been proposed or imple-
mented suffer from the same basic flaw: they are stopgap meas-
quired a permit to be obtained before entry into a small, heavily used
zone within each of these wildernesses. The permits were issued on a
first-come-first-served basis, although they could be obtained in advance.
Once the quota for the day was reached, visitors were asked to enter
another zone within the wilderness instead of the heavily used zone
which they had requested. Overnight use-which was the only type of
use rationed in the San Jacinto wilderness-was rationed by requiring
a permit to camp at specified campsites. Enforcement was by means
of a roving "wilderness ranger". Telephone call to Carl Westrate, supra
note 98.
108. The National Park Service plan, although not limited to na-
tional park wilderness areas, is very similar to that being used by the
Forest Service, see note 107 supra. Hikers and campers must obtain
a free permit to use specified trails in the remote backcountry areas of
a number of major parks. The number of permits issued for each trail
or campsite is limited to the number of visitors which park personnel
feel these areas can accommodate without environmental damage. When
the maximum is reached, other available trails are suggested to appli-
cants. Permits are issued on a first-come-first-served basis. National
Park Service Extends Backcountry Protection Plan, supra note 98.
109. See authorities cited in note 98 supra.
110. Any rationing system, by its operation, would favor some group
over others. A fee system favors the rich, while a first-come-first-served
system favors early risers and those who live nearby. The idea that
there should be free access to our public lands is deeply rooted and mili-
tates against any rationing system. See Hearings on S. 1893, supra note
104, at 68-69.
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ures intended to preserve the multiple-use character of the land
while at the same time avoiding damage to the wilderness re-
source. The effect of overuse upon the wilderness idea has been
neither considered nor remedied; in fact, it is in a sense aggra-
vated by imposing further management on the natural area. Yet
these results necessarily follow from the heavy emphasis placed
on multiple-use and recreation by the governing statutes. So
long as this emphasis remains, the problems which now beset
wilderness managers cannot be effectively solved.
Therefore, the first step toward a solution is removal of the
multiple-use mandate from the statute. The concept of wilder-
ness is incompatible with the concept of multiple-use: wilder-
ness is essentially a single-use or, more properly, a non-use. If
administrators are forced to view protected areas as multiple-
use land, they cannot make proper decisions in terms of what
best preserves the wilderness character. Wilderness managers
are similarly constrained by the emphasis on recreation, which
therefore should also be removed from the Wilderness Act.
This is not to say that recreation or other compatible uses
should be banned from wilderness areas. To a limited extent,
these activities can take place without damaging either the re-
source or the wilderness experience of visitors. The danger lies
not in permitting, but in requiring, wilderness lands to be made
available for such uses. If the administrator does not have the
discretion to permit or prohibit such uses on the basis of their
compatibility with wilderness values-as is true under the mul-
tiple-use mandate of the Act-wilderness preservation becomes
secondary to recreation and other uses..
If the multiple-use concept is deleted from the Wilderness
Act and all references indicating the primacy of other uses are
removed, the way will be open for the administrator to consider
solutions to the problems which endanger wilderness values
without considering the effect of those solutions on other uses.
In attempting to solve the problems presented by recreational
overuse, the administrator would no longer be constrained by
the need to keep the wilderness open to the maximum extent
as a recreation area. The problem would still remain, of course-
changing the structure of the Act could be expected to have no
effect on the demand for primitive recreation-but the change
in the Act would allow a greater freedom in attacking that prob-
lem.
One solution which has been proposed by several writers,
and which would be feasible upon the removal of the multiple-
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use mandate, is a shift to emphasizing user concepts of recrea-
tional land.1 1 Basically, this proposal would reserve wilderness
areas for those people who truly desire an unmanaged, wild, and
natural recreation experience-without maps, trails, privies, or
other similar conveniences. Other areas of varying degrees of
"comfort"-and hence management-would be provided to ac-
commodate the recreationists who would be satisfied with some-
thing less than a completely primitive wilderness.1 12 If a num-
111. This idea was developed by Robert C. Lucas, a Forest Service
scientist, on the basis of his studies of user perceptions of wilderness.
Dr. Lucas concluded:
There are different wildernesses. The dichotomy, which the
Wilderness Act continues, between wilderness in one class and
all other land in another class, may be unfortunate. A variety
of access and facilities, degrees of restriction of nonrecreational
uses, and limits on type and amount of recreational use, seems
to be implied.
Lucas, Wilderness-User Concepts, 15 NATURALIST, Winter, 1964, at 22, 25-
26. See also Hearings on S. 316, supra note 83, at 33 (Sen. Hatfield);
ORRRC STUDy REPORT 3, supra note 7, at 11. Confirmation of the con-
sistency of the semi-wilderness proposal with the statutory definition of
wilderness is provided by the National Park Servic% which recognizes
the dual definition of wilderness, see Scoyen, National Park Wilderness,
in Voiczs roR THE WnzERNEss 22 (W. Schwartz ed., 1969), and at present
maintains a semi-wilderness program within each national park. See
Hartzog, The Wilderness Act and the National Parks and Monuments,
in WnDERN-S ANm THE QuArm= Or LIFE, 13, 19-22 (1969). The National
Park Service divides land into six classes; one represents wilderness-type
areas and another (Class III) is a transition zone similar to semi-wilder-
ness. But see FSM, supra note 49, § 2320.3 (9), which declares that buffer
strips will not be maintained for national forest wilderness. The Park
Service has been criticized, however, for allegedly classifying land suit-
able as wilderness into this transition zone, where it is not protected from
development. See, e.g., Brandborg, infra note 115, at 31, 37.
112. For exampl% Dr. Lucas found in one study that motorboaters
and canoeists perceived wilderness differently: the motorboaters were
willing to accept more frequent contact with other humans than were
the canoeists. Lucas, Wilderness Perception and Use: The Example of
the Boundary Waters Canoe Area, 3 NATuRAL REsouRcEs J. 394 (1964).
Based on observations such as this, he recommended:
User concepts make possible evaluation of rationing recreational
use in terms of at least some measure of its effect on the quality
of the use. Expansion might be considered, at least in part, in
terms of setting up various types of semi-wilderness in the pres-
ently roadless, undeveloped, but undesignated areas which still
exist .... The addition of semi-wilderness is probably more
feasible than establishing more strictly wilderness areas, and
might actually produce more satisfaction for more people at less
cost to society.
Lucas, supra note 111, at 26. One way of implementing Dr. Lucas' sug-
gestions might be to establish "buffer zones" to accommodate those rec-
reationists who would be satisfied with less than a full wilderness ex-
perience. These areas would be suitable for primitive recreation, al-
though not so primitive as that provided in true wilderness areas, and
would thereby be expected to divert demand from true wilderness areas,
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ber of areas of different degrees of primitiveness were present
in a given locality, administrative personnel could counsel with
the visitors to see that they went to the area which best suited
their desire and preparation. That there is a significant demand
for a less primitive type of recreation is indicated by the enor-
mous popularity of the Boundary Waters Canoe Area (BWCA) 113
in Minnesota,114 a semi-wilderness area protected by the Wilder-
ness Act. Since there are really no other areas like the BWCA
at present, that demand presumably now serves only to increase
the pressure on conventional wilderness areas.
At present, both the limitation of wilderness lands to wilder-
ness use and the establishment of semi-wilderness areas seem
unlikely. The wilderness manager is constrained by the mul-
tiple-use mandate to keep wilderness lands open to other uses,
and opponents of the semi-wilderness idea argue that it is merely
a scheme to avoid classifying roadless areas as wilderness so that
they remain in a less protected classification."15 Upon removal
of the multiple-use mandate from the Act, however, the wilder-
ness manager's constraint would disappear and the focus of the
preservationists' argument could shift to the classification proc-
ess of deciding what level of protection would best suit the char-
acter of each area. The objections of the opponents of semi-wil-
derness areas could be fully met by giving these lands statutory
protection as well, allowing only primitive recreational improve-
ments and establishing many of the safeguards now provided
for wilderness.
Such buffer zones of semi-wilderness might be immediately adjacent to
true wilderness areas or merely conveniently near. However, the current
Forest Service policy is that buffer strips will not be maintained for na-
tional forest wilderness. FSM, supra note 49, § 2320.3 (9).
113. This area has a long and colorful history. See generally S.
DANA, J. ALLISON & R. CUNNINGHAM, MINNESOTA LANDs 117-28 (1960).
It is now protected by the Wilderness Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1132(a) (1970),
but the statute establishes separate provisions for its management which
make it less of a true wilderness than the other "instant wildernesses"
created by the Act. See 16 U.S.C. § 1133 (d) (5) (1970). Present man-
agement practices on this unique semi-wilderness area are set forth in
FOREST SERVICE, U.S. DEP'T or AGRIcuLTURE, BOUNDARY WATERS CANOE
AREA MANAGEMENT HANDBOOK (1972). See also FOREST SERVICE, U.S.
DET or AGRIcULTURE, BOUNDARY WATERS CANOE AREA MANAGEMENT
PLAN AND ENVIRONMENTAL STATEMENT (1974).
114. See text accompanying note 89 supra.
115. See, e.g., Brandborg, The Wilderness Act: The First Three
Years, in WILDERNESS Am =r QUALITY or LIFE 31, 37 (1969); Discussion,
id. at 49-50. But see Marshall, Introduction to WILDERNESS AND THE
QUAL=T or LIFE, supra at xv; Piel, Wilderness and the American Dream,
in VoicEs FOR THE WIERNESS, supra note 111, at 52; Zahniser, Wilderness
Forever, in VOICES FOR T= WLDE ESS, supra at 98, 99.
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Preservation of semi-wilderness areas in a near-natural state
would allow true wilderness areas to be preserved in a com-
pletely natural, unmanaged condition. The exact nature of that
condition would, of course, remain a matter of definition since
certain minimal management functions would probably be re-
quired no matter how little one wished to interfere with the area;
for example, administrators would no doubt want to keep the
area under general observation to prevent conditions such
as fires or insect plagues on the wilderness land from spreading
to adjacent non-wilderness land. But management actions
should be limited to those absolutely necessary to preserve the
wilderness; this would tend to exclude the most objectionable in-
terferences, such as trails, privies, maps, signs, and other im-
provements which only serve to encourage recreational use.1 ,1
Use of the land would still be possible for those persons willing to
accept the land without such improvements, but management de-
signed for recreation or other multiple-uses would not be under-
taken.
Obviously, the semi-wilderness proposal is not without its
drawbacks. 117 There would be problems in its implementation,
116. See ORRRC STUDY REPORT 3, supra note 7, at 302: "Generally,
it is our impression that constructed 'primitive' facilities along major
trails are not appropriate to wilderness recreation use, and they act as
concentration points deleterious to wilderness conditions."
117. A number of arguments have been raised in opposition to the
idea. The agencies charged with the protection of wilderness lands have
long maintained that certain management of wilderness areas is neces-
sary to accommodate recreational use without permanently damaging the
area. For example, Edward Cli Chief of the Forest Service, recently
stated, "I am personally convinced that the wilderness of the future must
be skillfully managed if it is to survive the large increase in use that
can be expected." Cliff, Discussion, in TomoRmow's WmLDERNESS 176, 179
(F. Leydet ed., 1963). Without trails, maps, publicity, or conveniences,
however, it is to be hoped that recreational use would be light enough
to obviate the need for such protection. A more serious argument
against this concept is that it would result in the creation of an elitist
wilderness. See, e.g., Hearings on S. 1176, supra note 80, at 98-108 (testi-
mony of the Chief of the Forest Service); Hearings on S. 4 Before the
Subcomm. on Public Lands of the Senate Comm. on Interior and Insular
Affairs, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 78-79 (1963). Wilderness, however, is by
definition elitist; it is an area where only a few may enter and none
may remain. Some rationing system is surely necessary in view of the
threat of recreational overuse, and a rationing system by its very nature
excludes some persons who want to enter. The semi-wilderness system
would be fairer than most, since it would ration on the basis of the pref-
erences of the visitor; if he honestly desires a true wilderness experience,
then he would not be prevented from entering the wilderness to obtain
it; if, on the other hand, he is content with a primitive recreational op-
portunity, this, too, would be available.
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such as the control of litter on the unmanaged true wilderness
land. But these problems should be significantly fewer and
smaller than those faced by wilderness managers today, because
the conflicts underlying many of the current problems would be
eliminated.
The tension between the two halves of the dual definition
would remain. With the multiple-use concept removed, however,
a balance between the two parts would be restored. For example,
if the semi-wilderness proposal should be adopted, the "true" wil-
derness areas could be preserved in a completely natural state,
both by a drastic reduction in the number of visitors and by
a "hands off" management philosophy, while recreational use and
other uses compatible with the overriding purpose of wilderness
preservation would still be permitted to a limited extent. Thus
both the purist and the practicalist would be accommodated; the
balancing approach would be allowed to function at the policy
level as well as at the level of day-to-day management decisions.
If the semi-wilderness proposal were not simultaneously adopted,
the same result could nevertheless be obtained, but the excess
recreational demand would have to be turned away rather than
satisfied in alternate ways. Clarification of the definition might
be desirable in any case in order to ease the problems of classi-
fication,"1 8 but the major management problems could be al-
leviated by removal of the multiple-use mandate for wilderness
land.
V. CONCLUSION
Wilderness is a spendthrift trust. By setting aside wilder-
ness land we preserve certain things, both tangible and intan-
gible,11 against the excesses of the present. Any use which is
to be made of that land in the present should be consistent with
the objectives of preservation for the future. The multiple-use
provision in the Wilderness Act now makes this nearly impossible
and should be eliminated so as to free the administering agencies
to take any steps they deem necessary to protect the land.
In doing this, of course, the growing demand for primitive
recreation cannot be ignored. This demand, however, does not
have to be met by treating all our wilderness areas as recrea-
tional land. Greater attention must be paid to the full range
of needs of the primitive recreationist, and attempts must be
made to satisfy those needs without invading wilderness. It is
118. See text accompanying notes 14-27 supra.
119. See note 7 supra.
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the responsibility of the wilderness manager to work out solu-
tions to these problems which best accommodate all needs; it
is this for which he has been trained. He cannot do this job
so long as he is restrained by statutory provisions which limit
his discretion. The courts have recognized the need for wide
discretion on the part of the wilderness manager; 120 Congress
should do likewise.
120. See Izaak Walton League v. St. Clair, 497 F.2d 849 (8th Cir.),
cert. denied, 43 U.S.L.W. 3274 (U.S. Nov. 12, 1974), where the court of
appeals reversed the district court's ban on mineral exploration in the
BWCA and remanded with directions that the Forest Service should be
allowed to determine whether an exploration permit should be granted,
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